Bankruptcy -- Survival of Liability for Willful and Malicious Injury by Porter, W. Travis
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 38 | Number 3 Article 7
4-1-1960
Bankruptcy -- Survival of Liability for Willful and
Malicious Injury
W. Travis Porter
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
W. T. Porter, Bankruptcy -- Survival of Liability for Willful and Malicious Injury, 38 N.C. L. Rev. 384 (1960).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol38/iss3/7
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the appeal provision of the Milk Commission Act 29 to prevent such an
occurrence. The appeal provisions of the Virginia Milk Commission
Act30 limit the court to determining if the order appealed is within
the discretion vested in the Commission, and if so, whether the Com-
mission has exercised a reasonable discretion or the order is unreasonable
or capricious. Legislative action would not be required, however, if
the supreme court were to adopt the Connecticut court's concept of
the purpose of a trial de novo on appeal from an administrative body8 '
and limit the superior courts to the determination of the single ques-
tion "Has the Commission acted illegally?"
G. DUDLEY HUMPHREY, JR.
Bankruptcy-Survival of Liability for Willful and Malicious Injury
The Bankruptcy Act' operates as a discharge or release of a bankrupt
from all his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, except such as are
excepted in the act, and has as its purpose to relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness with leave to start afresh. 2
Where the liability or debt is the result of a judgment arising out of
automobile accidents the idea of discharge has met with considerable
criticism. This criticism may be illustrated by the language of a New
York case where it was said:
If the court were permitted to do moral justice instead of legal
justice it would refuse to discharge the bankrupt of the judgments.
There are too many accidents resulting in judgments which are
wiped out in bankruptcy. The practice has grown up wherein a
person will negligently operate his automobile and then when a
judgment for such injuries is rendered against him, will obtain the
protection of the Bankruptcy Law by filing a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy . . . Operators of automobiles may drive in a
careless and negligent manner and go unscathed of justice by
filing a petition in bankruptcy.'
Although liabilities which are the result of willful and malicious
injuries to person or property are not dischargeable in bankruptcy,4 the
courts are by no means in accord as to what constitutes willful and
malicious conduct. Most of the cases seem to lie between the areas
29 N.C. Gm. STAT. § 106-266.17 (Supp. 1959).
2 0 VA. CoDE §§ 3-369 to -371 (1950).
"' See note 11 supra.
'Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended by 66 Stat. 420
(1952), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1086 (1958).
'Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915).3 Francine v. Babayan, 45 F. Supp. 321, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
4 Bankruptcy Act ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1958).
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where the injury is produced by ordinary negligence and where it is the
result of a deliberate and intentional wrongdoing. A majority of
cases have decided that no degree of negligence can produce a willful and
malicious injury.5 This view is buttressed by the theory that exceptions
tend to impair the bankrupt's remedy, and that since the statute is
highly remedial, these exceptions should be so construed as to affect
that remedy only so far as is necessarily required by its express terms.'
The modem trend, however, favors the interpretation that "willful
and malicious injuries to the person," as used in the act, does not
necessarily connote ill will or special malice, but describes a wrongful
act done in utter disregard of the legal rights of others and without
just or lawful support, evidencing a reckless disregard and indifference
to the safety of human life resulting in injury to the person or property
of another. This view is based on the theory that bankruptcy should
not be allowed to function as a refuge for reckless drivers.7
It appears that North Carolina would follow the modern trend.
Our court has considered the question of what is willful and malicious
in deciding cases under our civil arrest statutes and in cases involving
punitive damages. In a case0 where the evidence tended to show that
defendant was driving an automobile at an excessive rate of speed near
the center of a populous town on Sunday, at the time people were going
to church, and ran on the sidewalk striking plaintiff, our court found
these facts sufficient for a jury to find an intent on the defendant's part
willfully to injure the plaintiff, justifying civil arrest of defendant. The
court adopted as one of the definitions of willfulness and wantonness:
"[N]egligence so gross as to manifest a reckless indifference to the
rights of another."10  The court also cited as a correct charge to the
jury the following:
To establish the charge of willfulness .. an actual intent to do
the particular injury alleged need not be shown; but if you find
from all the evidence that the misconduct of the defendant's
529 REP. J. 70 (1955).
'1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTcY 1609 (14th ed. 1940).
7 29 REP. J. 70 (1955).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-410 (1953). "The defendant may be arrested . . .in
the following cases: 1. In an action . . .not arising out of contract where the
action is for wilful, wanton, or malicious injury to person . .. ."
o Weathers v. Baldwvin, 183 N.C. 276, 111 S.E. 183 (1922) ; accord, Foster v.
Hyman, 197 N.C. 189, 148 S.E. 36 (1929), where defendant while drunk drove his
automobile on the wrong side of a city street where traffic was heavy. The court
held this sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict that the injury was inflicted will-
fully and wantonly, and thus an order for execution against the person or defendant
was proper. In Braxton v. Matthews, 199 N.C. 484, 154 S.E. 735 (1930), it was
held that driving recklessly while intoxicated was sufficient to warrant the submis-
sion of an issue as to willful, wanton conduct and to sustain an affirmative answer
thereto.
"0 Weathers v. Baldwin, 183 N.C. 276, 279, 111 S.E. 183, 185 (1922).
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servants was such as to evince an utter disregard of consequences,
so as to inflict the injury complained of, this may of itself tend
to establish wilifullness. 11
In general, punitive damages may not be recovered in a case in-
volving ordinary negligence in the absence of any intentional, malicious,
or willful act. Wanton conduct, i.e., intentional wrongdoing, is a
sufficient basis for an award of punitive damages. North Carolina
has held conduct to be wanton when in conscious and intentional dis-
regard of and indifference to the rights and safety of others.12 That
North Carolina shares the modern view and does not require a showing
of special malice or intent to injure a particular person13 is further
borne out by the requirements for allegations sufficient for an award of
punitive damages which are said to be:
[T]he complaint must allege facts showing . . . circumstances
which would justify the award, for instance, actual malice, or
oppression, or gross and wilful wrong, or wanton and reckless
disregard of plaintiff's rights.'4
Most courts tend to brand certain specified acts of negligence as
sufficient to bring the liability within the scope of the exceptions of sec-
tion 17 of the Bankruptcy Act. Thus, where it appeared that the bank-
rupt was driving on the wrong side of the road,15 deliberately disre-
garding a traffic signal,16 and passing another car while it was impossible
to see aheady' courts have held the resulting liability to be non-
dischargeable. However, the acts of speeding,' 8 passing a streetcar or
school bus,19 colliding with a parked car,20 or negligently crossing a
railroad track2' have been held not to entail sufficient disregard for the
safety of others to be classified as willful and malicious. The most recent
21 Id. at 279-80, 111 S.E. at 185.
"Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E.2d 393 (1956).
" In Foster v. Hyman, 197 N.C. 189, 148 S.E. 36 (1929), it was held that
willfullness may be constructive, and where the wrongdoer's conduct is so reckless
as to amount to a disregard for the safety of others it is equivalent to actual intent.
1 Lutz Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 344, 88 S.E.2d 333, 342
(1955). (Emphasis added.)
"Its re Dutkiewicz, 27 F.2d 334 (W.D.N.Y. 1928); Margulies v. Garwood,
36 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Doty v. Rogers, 213 S.C. 361, 49 S.E.2d 594(1948).
" Tharpe v. Breitowich, 323 Ill. App. 261, 55 N.E.2d 392 (1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 801 (1945). Contra, I; re Longdo, 45 F.2d 246 (N.D.N.Y. 1930).
"1 Margulies v. Garwood, 36 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. 1942). Contra, Ran-
dolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202 S.W.2d 664 (1947) (restating the old rule).
" Freedman v. Cooper, 126 N.J.L. 177, 17 A.2d 609 (1941); Campbell v.
Norgart, 73 N.D. 297, 14 N.W.2d 260 (1944).
" In re Tillery, 16 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ga. 1936); Wyka v. Benedicks, 266
App. Div. 1025, 44 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1943).
" Campbell v. Norgart, 73 N.D. 297, 14 N.W.2d 260 (1944) ; Prater v. King,
73 Ga. App. 393, 37 S.E.2d 155 (1946).
" Nunn v. Drieborg, 235 Mich. 383, 209 N.W. 89 (1926).
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cases show that the uncertainty still exists as to driving when intoxi-
cated, but the trend, at least in the federal courts, seems to be toward
holding this misconduct sufficient for a finding of willful and malicious
conduct.22
Assuming a close case where the court would be justified either in
finding or in not finding willful and malicious conduct, counsel for both
sides should decide what effect a bankruptcy by defendant would have
on his client and how best to gain or avoid the benefits or handicaps of
such bankruptcy. What should the plaintiff allege in his complaint?
A judgment which is not based on an allegation or willful and malicious
conduct is seldom declared to be based on a wrongdoing of such
gravity as to justify denying a discharge.2 The complaint is of par-
ticular importance in a jurisdiction such as North Carolina where spe-
cific issues are submitted to the jury and the jury responds to issues and
does not find a general verdict.24 In order for counsel to have the trial
judge instruct the jury as to willful and wanton conduct such conduct
must be alleged in the complaint.25  However, allegations in the com-
plaint are not alone sufficient to insure the submission of an issue as to
willfulness and malice to the jury. Before an issue can be submitted
to the jury, it must be supported by the evidence.26 Thus it is said
that in civil actions the issues are framed on both the pleadings and
the evidence32 A trial judge in his charge to the jury should present
every substantial and essential feature of the case embraced within
the issue and arising on the evidence, and this without any special
prayer for instructions to that effect.
28
In a jurisdiction such as North Carolina that uses the issue system
the failure of counsel to cause an issue on willful and malicious conduct
to be submitted to the jury can be disastrous even though he has cor-
rectly pleaded such conduct and has supported his allegations with
proof.29 In a late New York case8 ° plaintiff's counsel asked the
"' Den Haerynck v. Thompson, 228 F.2d 72 (10th Cir. 1955).
23 29 R F. J. 70 (1955).
"'Witsell v. West Asheville & S.S. Ry., 120 N.C. 557, 27 S.E. 125 (1897).
"Wilson v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 142 N.C. 333, 55 S.E. 257 (1906).
" Carland v. Allison, 221 N.C. 120, 19 S.E.2d 245 (1942) ; Henderson v. At-
lantic Coast Line R.RL, 171 N.C. 397, 88 S.E. 626 (1916).
7Crouse v. Vernon, 232 N.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 185 (1950).
28 Smith v. Kappas, 219 N.C. 850, 15 S.E.2d 375 (1941). Griffin v. United
Services Life Ins. Co., 225 N.C. 684, 36 S.E.2d 225 (1945), holds that it is the right
of counsel to have proper issues submitted. G.S. § 1-200 provides that it is the
duty of the attorneys in the case to prepare the issues arising upon the pleadings
and present them to the judge, to be by him submitted to the jury if approved.
This rule is mandatory, but if for any reason counsel does not so submit the
issues it is then the duty of the trial judge to frame the issues.
2" In Crowder v. Stiers, 215 N.C. 123, 1 S.E.2d 353 (1939), it was held that in
order to warrant execution against the person in an action for tort it is necessary
that there be an affirmative finding by the jury upon a separate issue of express
or actual malice. Accord, McKinney v. Patterson, 174 N.C. 483, 93 S.E. 967
19601
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trial court to charge the jury respecting wanton negligence, but the
court refused to do so on the ground that plaintiff need prove only
ordinary negligence in order to recover. The jury rendered its verdict
for the plaintiff and the court expressed the opinion that defendant's
act came close to wanton negligence. On motion by defendant for an
order discharging the judgment against him the judgment was held not
to be based on willfull and malicious injury and thus to be dischargeable
in bankruptcy. The appellate court held that despite the trial court's
opinion, the jury's verdict was conclusive only as to the fact that de-
fendant was negligent and that to be non-dischargeable the judgment
roll must show that the judgment was based on a willful and malicious
wrong.
The submission of proper issues is also vitally important to the
defense counsel. If a verdict is ambiguous in its terms, the ambiguity
may sometimes be explained and the verdict interpreted by reference to
and in connection with pleadings, evidence, and the charge of the trial
court.3 1 So if plaintiff's attorney has alleged willful and malicious con-
duct and has put on evidence to support his allegations it could be unsafe
for the defendant to fail to submit the specific issue. New York has held
in determining whether a judgment is dischargeable in bankruptcy, resort
may be had to the entire record to determine the wrongful character
of the act on which the judgment was based, and the form or allegations
of the complaint are not conclusive.32 The Minnesota court has gone
so far as to allow a judgment creditor to show by evidence extrinsic to
the record the non-dischargeable character of the original obligation,
notwithstanding the fact that the judgment roll on its face did not show
that it was a debt not dischargeable in bankruptcy.s
Thus it appears that if the North Carolina court, since there are no
North Carolina decisions in this area, resorts to other jurisdictions in
formulating decisions on this facet of the bankruptcy law the only safe
course for both plaintiff and defendant is to be sure the issue of willful
and malicious conduct is submitted to the jury for determination.3 4
(1917), holding that before execution against a tortfeasor can issue it is necessary
that the jury find affirmatively upon an issue as to whether the tortious act was
done willfully. The court enunciated the general rule as being that a party cannot
object after the time for submitting issues has passed, and certainly not after the
verdict, that an issue, for which he made no request, was not submitted by the
court. In Turlington v. Aman, 163 N.C. 555, 79 S.E. 1102 (1913), it was held that
in order to issue an execution against the person of the defendant in cases where it
is permissible, the cause of arrest must be pleaded and proved and judgment
rendered.
" Thibadeau v. Lonschein, 186 N.Y.S.2d 73 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
Cody v. England, 216 N.C. 604, 5 S.E.2d 833 (1939).
Proctor Sec. Corp. v. Handler, 162 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1959).33Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Caruso, 252 Minn. 435, 90 N.W.2d 302 (1958).
3' See discussion in note 29 mtpra.
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A defendant's counsel, realizing his client is presently insolvent, may
feel that the simplest approach is to allow a default to be entered and then
have the judgment discharged in bankruptcy. This would not seem to
be a wise course in those cases where willful and malicious conduct or
facts from which such conduct could be inferred are alleged in the
complaint. In a personal injury case the proper result when no pleadings
are filed by defendant is default and inquiry since the damages are not
liquidated.35 The effect of a judgment by default and inquiry is three-
fold: (1) It establishes a right of action of the kind properly pleaded
in the complaint. (2) It determines the right of the plaintiff to recover
at least nominal damages and costs. (3) It precludes the defendant
from offering any evidence in the inquiry to show that the plaintiff has
no right to action.30 Thus if the defendant fails to appear at the inquiry
the plaintiff will be free to put on evidence of willful and malicious con-
duct without fear of rebuttal and be confident of a favorable finding
on this issue. If the plaintiff follows this reasoning in the conduct of his
case the defendant's subsequent discharge will be of no avail against the
judgment. But on the other hand it is equally clear that the plaintiff can-
not rely merely on the allegations of his complaint when the defendant
fails to appear or plead. To be safe the plaintiff must frame the issue
of willful and malicious conduct, put on evidence to support his con-
tention and have the issue submitted for final determination.
In a Colorado case the complaint for damages allegedly suffered in
an automobile collision alleged that defendant's negligence consisted of
reckless or willful disregard of the rights of others. The trial court
heard evidence in support of such allegation and entered default judg-
ment without specifically finding that more than simple negligence was
shown. The plaintiffs had execution on the judgment and the defendant
interposed his discharge as defense to the execution. The plaintiffs
contended that when defendant permitted default to enter against him
he admitted the truth of all facts properly alleged in the complaint and
that this created a non-dischargeable obligation. The court held the
judgment debt discharged and said:
If plaintiffs desired to protect themselves against the possibility
that defendant might seek a discharge in bankruptcy, it was in-
cumbent on them to secure a specific finding in the trial court that
the negligence of defendant was such that a discharge in bank-
ruptcy would not operate to release the judgment.3 7
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-212 (1953).
30 Howze v. McCall, 249 N.C. 250, 106 S.E.2d 236 (1958).
Valdez v. Sams, 134 Colo. 488, 491, 307 P.2d 189, 190 (1957). (Emphasis
added.)
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An Ohio courta8 has gone so far as to look beyond the record, which
recited that it was the wrongful and intentional acts of defendant that
caused the injury, to the evidence offered at the time of judgment to
determine whether the action was actually based on wrongful acts or
whether it resulted from mere negligence. This court found that the
evidence supported mere negligence only and held the bankrupt dis-
charged. This case seems to follow the modern trend of decisions that
a court is not concluded by allegations of the complaint and resort
may be had to the entire record to determine whether the action was
one for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of
another.39  Though the modern trend is toward this view there is still
a definite split of authority.40 The California court expresses the con-
trary view as follows:
By permitting his default to be entered he [the defendant] con-
fessed the truth of all the material allegations in the complaint
. . . including the allegations of wantoness, recklessness and
gross carelessness .... A judgment by default is as conclusive
as to the issues tendered by the complaint as if it had been
rendered after answer filed and trial had on allegations denied
by the answer. . . . Such a judgment is res judicata as to all
issues aptly pleaded in the complaint and defendant is estopped
from denying in a subsequent action any allegations contained in
the former complaint.41
In view of the foregoing it submitted that the best course for both
plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys to pursue in their attempt to secure
justice for their clients and prevent further litigation is simply to make
every effort in cases where willful and malicious injury could be in-
volved to have the issue submitted to the jury. It is believed that if
this course is followed there will be no need for a defendant or a plain-
tiff to try the issue of whether a particular judgment is or is not dis-
charged in bankruptcy when the judgment is sued on. The verdict and
judgment on this issue by the court trying the personal injury action
will put an end to litigation of dischargeability.
W. TRAvis PORTER
a Carroll v. Jones, 3 Ohio Op. 2d 221, 141 N.E.2d 239 (1956).
' Annot., 145 A.L.R. 1238 (1943).
Tharpe v. Breitowich, 323 Ill. App. 261, 55 N.E.2d 392 (1944) ; Reell ex rel.
Haskin v. Central Illinois Elec. & Gas Co., 317 Ill. App. 106, 45 N.E.2d 500(1942).
" Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal. App. 2d 127, 177 P.2d 364, 366 (1947).
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